This publication is co-sponsored
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

© Copyright by Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2020

Technical editor and cover designer

Dorota Dołęgowska

Proofreader

Brien Barnett

ISBN (ebook)

978-83-66091-61-0

Publisher

Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
ul. Warecka 1a, 00-950 Warszawa
tel. 22 556 80 00, faks 22 556 80 99,
e-mail: ppd@pism.pl

E-book made by

eLitera s.c.

INTRODUCTION

NATO-Russia relations are of keen interest to researchers and practitioners of contemporary international politics as they are both a pillar of Euro-Atlantic and global security and an arena of major controversy. These relations involve many fundamental issues, including power politics, nuclear policy, hybrid warfare, broadly understood Euro-Atlantic relations, and problems of the post-Soviet space, observance of international law and political obligations of states, issues of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis resolution, cooperative security, combating terrorism, or confidence-building measures.

Such a broad basis for NATO-Russian contacts is only to a limited extent a natural legacy of the past Cold War East-West relations. Above all, it was deliberately and gradually shaped by both sides after 1989 (although, more precisely, this timeline should be moved forward at least by two years). However, it was neither a continuous process, nor an awareness of the high stakes programmed permanently into the behaviour and attitudes of Moscow and Brussels, removing from their mutual relations the rivalry or traditional components of their respective strategic cultures. The evolution of these relations, and to a large extent their current state, proves this. As a result of the 2013–14 illegal Russian annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Donbas–in both cases, the sovereign territory of Ukraine–NATO-Russia relations are probably at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War and lack any predictable prospect of their gradual improvement.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO-Soviet Union/Russia relations expressed the (unrealised) idea of a partnership based on mutual predictability and military security supported by lower levels of readiness and offensive capabilities, observance of international law and the promotion of democratic values and practices, individual freedom, and market economy. In the background remained, in a sense, logical, the Huntingtonian forecast (formulated more than two decades ago in his seminal Clash of Civilizations) of an alliance between Moscow and the West. Such was certainly NATO’s idea guiding the deliberate construction of its partnership with Russia. It also contained resolute support for the build-up of Russian democracy modelled after liberal democracies and making it a predictable, constructive participant in international relations, willing to take responsibility commensurate with its own international roles. To make this vision a reality, the Alliance was ready to go very far, offering serious cooperation to the other side, self-limiting its military strength and giving up many of its attributes that had built up an allied standard of collective defence and deterrence for decades. This was evidenced by NATO military absence on its new Eastern Flank, following the accession of new member states, which started in 1999. The developments did not confirm these expectations, which does not change the fact that for more than 20 years, the Alliance has always been the source of strategic initiatives in its relations with Russia.

However, no expected response was received to the extent of the presented offer and political gestures indicating a lack of hostile and aggressive intentions. Although, the Russian objectives regarding NATO had evolved–in proportion to Moscow’s changing power over time (the more power, the more assertiveness)–the geopolitical imperatives of Russian state strategy continuously guided its actions. These included stopping NATO’s enlargement and minimising “losses” in Central and Eastern Europe, considered its sphere of influence, hedging against Western involvement on the territory of Russia and the former Soviet Union, including “zero tolerance” towards its criticism of Russian actions conducted there (e.g., the war in Chechnya). As an alternative to NATO enlargement, Russia–with interruptions, but consistently since the 1990s–has promoted various arrangements regarding mutual relations of existing international security organisations or their actual replacement by new institutional constructs better positioning Russia and other powers. Its real goal, however, was to become a privileged co-decision-maker in the process of creating a post-Cold War security order in Europe. It also included the legitimacy of the Commonwealth of Independent States (and, since 2003, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) as NATO’s “equivalent” and the subordination of both organisations to external oversight exercised by a new authority in which Moscow would be a party with other powers. The aim was therefore to paralyse the Alliance’s activities.

The Russian objective was also to “push” the U.S. military out of Europe, i.e., to destroy NATO and to divide the allies. And the method to achieve that objective was to utilise its contacts with NATO, to weaken the Alliance’s integrity from within, to bilateralise cooperation with the member states and, if possible, to influence the allied decision-making processes. Therefore, throughout the post-Cold War period, there was a mixture of Russian (tactical) cooperation and (strategic) assertiveness. Moscow, though hesitantly, entered the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace programme. It also participated (with its chain of command) in the IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Alliance’s readiness to accept the Central European countries that were considered Moscow’s sphere of interests became, in the view of Russian elites, key evidence of NATO’s aggressive and expansionist nature. The consistency that can be found in Russia’s policy towards the Alliance (regardless of periods of detente, or necessary cooperation in periods of greatest weakness at the turn of the centuries) is an important factor contributing to the reflection on Russian state strategy.

However, regardless of the adopted perspective of an observer or analyst, and optimism/pessimism related to NATO-Russia relations, they will remain a key aspect of international security. This necessitates the search for “source knowledge” and “decoding” numerous stereotypes and simplifications that these relations have overgrown for the last quarter century. One must not forget the calculated and deliberate disinformation that Russia has been practising regarding its relations with the Alliance. It consistently uses the myth of “betrayal of the West,” blaming NATO nations for being the primary cause of the current state of NATO-Russia relations. It is not our task in this volume to explain the nature of these problems exhaustively, nor to discuss the structure of modern Russian political mythology. However, the significant dispersion of “first-hand” sources raises the bar of problems confronting researchers of NATO-Russia relations. Therefore, this volume attempts at gathering key open-source documents produced by both sides and arranging them into a representative whole to provide a better understanding of the “big picture.” Judging by its content, it is worthwhile to read collections of documents as monographs. The emerging picture of political thinking and policy justifications offers the power of beating back many stereotypical opinions.

NATO-Russia relations developed at an uneven pace after the end of the Cold War. There were periods of optimism (the decade of the 1990s) but also of crises and dramatic moments (cooperation was suspended several times), and the overall balance is heavily burdened by the events of the last few years since Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Moscow’s violations of international law and its political obligations towards foreign partners, as well as a full-scale information war against the West, combined with provocative military behaviour at NATO’s borders (land, air, sea, and cyber) led to another suspension of practical cooperation with Brussels.

The detailed periodisation of NATO-Russia relations between the two parties after the end of the Cold War, done separately from the NATO and Russian perspectives, could look different. In general, however, four stages can be distinguished:

– The first is the extended transition from the Cold War context to one of relations between the West and the Soviet Union, and then with the countries that attempted to build their independence after its dissolution, and with Russia. This period is undoubtedly heterogeneous, as it links (in a certain simplification) NATO’s relations with both the USSR and later with Russia. It involves the formalisation of these contacts and the consolidation of Moscow’s position as a special partner–the first among all other successors of the USSR building institutional relations in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (then the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) and the Partnership for Peace.

– In 1997, it smoothly enters a second stage, symbolically expressed by the signing of the “NATO-Russia Founding Act” containing the principles of mutual cooperation and by the creation of a joint institution, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

– It operated until 2002, and its transformation into the NATO-Russia Council opened the third stage of mutual relations.

– The Russian annexation of Crimea, followed by the aggression in the Ukrainian Donbas in 2014, combined with the suspension of cooperation with the Alliance, means opening the last stage, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability.

In each of these stages, extensive documentation was produced, the systematic analysis of which helps to reconstruct the dynamics of mutual relations and ideas shaping policies of both sides. It is available in print, electronic form, audio or film recordings. Nevertheless, it exists in great dispersion and various languages, both in Russia and NATO (systematically documenting its cooperation with Moscow). It is, therefore, reasonable to make an effort to gather in one place a collection of documents that presents the evolution of NATO-Russia relations after the end of the Cold War in a possibly impartial way.

Editorial notes

This volume, according to our knowledge, is so far the most comprehensive edited collection of documents regarding NATO-Russia relations. Its content was produced either by NATO or by Russia, and sometimes by common structures of both sides. The authors made efforts to use the original records of documents in English, Russian, or Polish. When necessary, they were carefully translated into English. Wherever other (published or not) translations could be referred to, they were reviewed, edited and, if necessary, corrected by the authors of this edition. In each case, the source of the base text was carefully noted.

Some comments should be made on the chronology of the documents published in this volume. Generally speaking, it covers the period 1991/1992–2020. We have made an exception to this structure with regard to a few documents relating to the declining period of the Cold War and the Alliance’s relations with the Soviet Union and, more broadly, with the Soviet republics/states emerging after its collapse. We considered this necessary for a proper understanding of the political context and the intentions of both sides that were developed in the following years.

The aforementioned chronology was also connected with the dilemma of selecting the method of presenting the documents contained in the volume. They form a collection, homogeneous within the general subject matter, but also separable into several groups from the point of view of their provenance and the originator. This allowed for several possible presentation approaches, from which the authors selected–in their understanding–the most user-friendly chronological system. Thus, the reader will find in this volume, given in chronological order (and if not, it has been indicated), primarily three distinct groups of documents concerning NATO-Russia relations.

The first of them are the materials (communiqués, statements, declarations, strategic concepts) produced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, especially its highest authorities–the North Atlantic Council. It met in a regular working composition of ambassadors, occasionally at political levels: foreign affairs or national defence ministers, as well as “at a top-level,” i.e., in the formula of heads of state and government. From a formal point of view, regardless of the political level, the documents have the same binding nature. However, it is a tradition that the most important ones for NATO policy were announced at the highest level.

The second group includes documents (statements, communiqués, declarations and work plans) issued jointly by NATO and Russia. They are the result of contacts–with different political and institutional bases–between the two parties over three periods: (a) ad hoc meetings (until 1997) aimed at shaping the organisational framework and principles of mutual relations, (b) the work of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), operating from 1997 to 2002 under the “Founding Act,” (c) the work of the NATO-Russia Council, into which the PJC was transformed under the Rome Declaration signed in 2002 as “NATO-Russia Relations. New quality.”

Finally, a third, separate group of documents are produced by Russia. They bring Moscow’s positions in the form of public speeches by politicians, correspondence, declarations or texts of a conceptual and doctrinal nature.

A careful reader will also find in this volume individual documents concerning Poland’s aspirations for membership in the Alliance, Moscow’s reaction, a situation in the Warsaw Pact and the summary of NATO-Russia relations made in 2013 by officials of the International Secretariat in Brussels. All of them, however, do not so much illustrate the particular issues of national security policy, but rather provide a detailed background to the issue addressed in this collection.

The authors/editors wish to present to the readers in this volume the 89 documents, either as a full text or the passages directly related to the topic. Each omission is carefully marked in the text, and the issues covered by the omitted passage are appropriately described in the footnotes. The documents are additionally annotated to explain more difficult concepts, political complexities of the issues discussed or their consequences if they have not been noted in subsequent materials.

A brief overview of the documents contained in this volume

The volume is introduced by the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 29–30 May 1989, which officially celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Alliance. The document is deeply immersed in the Cold War view of security and defence issues and East-West relations. In addition to confirming the principles of NATO’s collective defence and readiness for dialogue with communist countries, the political changes at its eastern borders were also noted. Progress was therefore expected in democratisation and a more open economic policy of the USSR and emancipating satellites. However, all attention in this and many subsequent NATO documents was focused on the consequences of the events taking place in Moscow. On mutual relations, they called for cooperation in overcoming the divisions of Europe, continuing work on disarmament agreements, and respecting the principles contained in the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In a similar spirit, but much more radically formulated were the speeches of the Soviet party at the time. In one of them, the Address by the Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, July 6, 1989, an outline of the concept of a “common European home” was presented. It assumed the strengthening of cooperation between the USSR and the West based on common (declared) values and interests, and the gradual creation of common structures by two European blocs: Western and Eastern. This was linked to a gradual revision–initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev after he came to power in 1985–of the existing USSR policy, both internal and economic, as well as foreign and security policy, under the slogans of perestroika (reconstruction) and “new thinking.” The main objective was to overcome the deepening crisis of the Soviet system and détente in relations with the West, allowing for easing the burden regarding the arms race. In foreign and security policy, Gorbachev and his advisors developed a political-propaganda campaign to convince public opinion and Western governments that the Soviet authorities sought radical changes in European and global security. These were to gradually lead, i.a., to complete nuclear disarmament, cooperation and, most importantly, the dissolution of existing military alliances–NATO and the Warsaw Pact–and building a new formula of European security based on the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The signal of NATO’s work on a more serious political offer to former opponents came only when changes in Eastern Europe reached “critical mass.” Message from Turnberry, published at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7–8 June 1990, contained the famous phrase “a hand of friendship and cooperation [extended] to the Soviet Union and all other European countries” as a sign of readiness for closer relations. It was to be based on respect for the sovereign political choices made by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the principles of freedom, democracy and justice.

The plan of the expected changes in NATO’s internal policy and the outline of the directions of cooperation with former opponents were brought by London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5-6 July 1990. It contained a proposal for the USSR and the countries of the collapsing Warsaw Pact to build partnership relations through direct contacts, political dialogue and the development of military cooperation. It appeared at the peak of the ongoing political debate in Europe on the future of the Alliance and new institutional security architecture. Although the London Declaration did not offer a coherent vision of future relations with former NATO opponents, it was a breakthrough accelerating the course of subsequent events. It introduced an idea of direct partnership relations with non-Allied states, perceived as a way of strengthening security and stability in Europe.

The dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central-Eastern Europe were of crucial importance for freeing the policies of the former communist states from the Moscow-run structures limiting their sovereignty. In the long run, this opened-up the problem of ensuring security for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some of them saw this as a way to declare their will to join the Alliance. Meanwhile, a letter from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to Polish President Lech Wałęsa concerning the liquidation of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact (forwarded in Warsaw on 12 February 1991) formally notified the member states of this issue (the others received correspondence identical to that of Poland). The Warsaw Pact finally ceased to exist on 1 July of that year and was accompanied by warnings from Moscow against any closer links between the former satellites and NATO.

In the Soviet Union itself, the situation seemed to be far from settled, and the attempt to stop the decay of the state, the breakdown of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the emancipation of the republics took the form of the so-called Moscow coup (also known as the Yanayev coup). It lasted three days in August 1991 and was a prelude to the final disintegration of the state. A series of declarations of sovereignty (or independence, as in Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia) in those republics that had not previously adopted such acts, marked a turning point in the process of the dismantlement of the USSR. The situation in Moscow at the time became the subject of a Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Brussels, 21 August 1991. It called for the restoration of state authorities and the maintenance of security in the country. It also reiterated NATO’s willingness to develop a partnership with Moscow and Central and Eastern European countries. The dynamic development of events in the Soviet Union soon resulted in the Statement on Developments in the Soviet Union Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991. It summarised NATO’s policy towards the USSR to date and formulated the expectation of its further peaceful and pro-democratic transformation and the fulfilment of its security obligations as the foundations of world peace and security in Europe.

Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7–8 November 1991, confirmed the directions of NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation. The process was described in detail in the so-called “new strategic concept.” It exposed the organisation’s ongoing deepened military and political transformation, reflecting the new realities in Europe. It announced the continuation of the allied core mission of collective defence and the dynamic development of dialogue and partnership with non-NATO countries. The declaration also indicated an institutional breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union and its former satellites. Sustaining its earlier declarations of cooperation and readiness to overcome the outcomes of the Cold War divisions and to work together for security, it announced the creation of a new structure for permanent political cooperation and consultation (North Atlantic Cooperation Council).

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome 7–8 November 1991, was the first NATO strategy amendment since 1967 and the first such document agreed upon by the allied states after the end of the Cold War. It brought a great project of political and military transformation of NATO under new security conditions. It also included new relations and dialogue with the Soviet Union/Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 19 December 1991 and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, Brussels, 20 December 1991, issued the following day, brought long-awaited details of the objectives, tasks, and forms of activity regarding this forum announced a few weeks earlier. Importantly, it was to be a common offer for Moscow and the former communist states–without distinguishing any of them. The written record of the Statement, apart from the above-mentioned details, illustrated the dramatic development of events connected with the collapse of the USSR.

The Russian reaction to the new NATO proposals was reflected in the Letter from the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin to the Participants of the Inaugural Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Moscow, December 21. After the failed attempt of the Yanayev coup, the fate of the Soviet state was sealed. The political initiative, also in foreign affairs, was taken over by Gorbachev’s rival, one of the leaders of the democratic movement and the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. One of the objectives of the authorities of the Russian Federation, arising on the ruins of the USSR, was to establish fully-fledged relations with the western states and international structures. NATO was also among them. Although the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was co-founded by the Soviet Union, its ambassador in Brussels, who read Yeltsin’s letter at the inaugural meeting of this forum, stated that he represented not the USSR but Russia (as noted in the NACC founding document). The letter included a far-reaching declaration of Russia’s willingness to become a member of NATO, although later-on the Kremlin–defending itself against political assaults by the communist and nationalist opposition–claimed that as a result of a typo, the word “not” was left out of the relevant sentence, obviously changing the essence of the declaration.

The Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), which was founded in 1992 and headed for many years by political scientist Sergei Karaganov, was one of the first analytical centres of the new Russia in the 1990s and the most influential of them. Although it formally was (and remains) a non-governmental structure, the participation of many of the leading experts of the time, as well as politicians, officials and businessmen, made it an important conceptual centre, influencing decision-making in the field of Russian foreign and security policy. In the absence of other strong structures of this kind, the SVOP reports were an important source of insight into the thinking about the world of some moderately pro-western Russian elites. The first major report, Strategy for Russia, Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), August 19, 1992, was an attempt to formulate the state strategy of the Russian Federation and was discussed worldwide. In its content, it points out, on the one hand, the will to gradually integrate with the Western world and, on the other hand, the inability to get rid of the ambition to have a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area and to create a buffer zone in Central Europe. The text is interesting because of its relative openness and sincerity in formulating Russian policy objectives.

Already in the first year following the dissolution of the USSR (1992), the Russian authorities made an effort to formulate the official conceptual basis of Russian foreign and defence policy. Due to the then turbulent political disputes, this took quite a long time. The first to appear was a draft military doctrine (in June 1992), which was finally adopted in a revised version after a year and a half of discussion, as Basic Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of President Boris Yeltsin of November 2, 1993. It reflected the focus on internal threats and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was not until January 1993 that the first official draft of the “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” was ready, published in a special volume of Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (official Russian series of diplomatic documents). The final version, which did not differ in any significant way, Basic Principles of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Approved by Decree of President Boris Yeltsin of April 23, 1993, reflected the then rather pragmatic and pro-Western line of Russia’s foreign policy, however, also the superpower’s claims and aspirations to retain influence in the post-Soviet area and in the former Eastern Bloc countries.

This was so vital that some of Moscow’s former allies (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) openly declared their desire to join NATO, supporting their initiatives in this respect with cooperation within the so-called Visegrad Group. The sequence of events from the late summer and autumn of 1993, described in four subsequent documents published in this volume, was important for the later expansion of the Alliance and its parallel establishment of relations with Russia. Chronologically, the first of them is The Polish–Russian Joint Declaration, Warsaw, August 25, 1993, published during the Warsaw meeting of the presidents of Poland and Russia. This is particularly true of its key phrase, almost hidden at the end of the document: “The presidents raised the issue of Poland’s intention to join NATO. President Lech Wałęsa explained Poland’s known position on this issue, which was accepted with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. Over the time horizon, such a decision of sovereign Poland, aiming at European integration, is not contrary to the interests of other countries, including Russia.” The way of obtaining this declaration, adopted against the prepared position of the Russian delegation to the Warsaw summit, is covered in secrecy, but–according to the report of Yeltsin’s Polish partner–fatigue and drunkenness of the Russian interlocutor had a great role to play. No wonder then that the declaration was disavowed in Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton, 15 September 1993, sent to the “own hands” of the leaders of the U.S., France, the UK, and Germany. It conveys the basic elements of Russia’s permanent (negative) position on NATO enlargement. This volume contains a version of the letter addressed to U.S. President Bill Clinton, which comes from recently declassified documents of the U.S. State Department. Earlier, this letter was (in 1994) published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI Yearbook in 1994) by the efforts of its then head, Adam D. Rotfeld. The two versions of the English translation are slightly different linguistically while conveying the same message. The arguments cited there were summarised in the Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Krzysztof Skubiszewski on National Policy Issues, In Particular Concerning the Letter of Russian President Boris Yeltsin of September 15, 1993, Addressed to the Leaders of France, Germany, the USA, and UK, Warsaw, October 4, 1993. It confirmed Poland’s aspiration to become a NATO member, the compliance of this process with international law, and its non-threatening nature to Russia.

The above sequence of events was commented on in an extensive Russian document, Problems of NATO Expansion. Report Presented by the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Evgeny Primakov, at a Press Conference in Moscow on November 25, 1993. It was a strong voice against the enlargement of the Alliance to include Central European countries. The publication and publicity of the civil intelligence report in November 1993 was an important part of the Russian diplomatic and propaganda campaign to undermine the process. In fact, it was addressed to the elite and public opinion of Western countries, presenting, i.a., developed major Russian arguments against NATO enlargement. Among them was the emphasis on the allegedly negative influence of this process on the internal political dynamics in Russia. It was supposed to weaken the “democrats” and strengthen the communist and nationalist opposition, whose growth was then very worrying for the Western elite. However, the “democratic” authorities of Russia at that time largely shared the vision of the geopolitical interests of the state of their internal opponents. The comparison of Yeltsin’s letter and Primakov’s report described earlier shows a close affinity of the two documents in terms of their political content.

Pressure from Central European nations declaring their interest in NATO membership prompted the Alliance to expand its offer of institutional cooperation with a new military cooperation programme called the Partnership for Peace. Its details were announced in the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994, and a document issued simultaneously, Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994. Although it offered more than NATO’s previous proposals, it did not satisfy the main addressees: neither the countries of Central Europe seeking a quick path to membership, nor Russia, willing to make sure that the Partnership for Peace would be its permanent substitute and additionally would offer Moscow special treatment in its partnership with the Alliance (more privileged that the one of the Central Europeans). From NATO’s point of view, the primary goal of the new programme open to all CSCE countries was to include Russia in the system of partnership cooperation and to mitigate its opposition to enlargement. This was outlined in a programme that did not, however, specify the time, criteria, or method of implementation.

Meanwhile, the course of Russian policy towards the West was toughening. The authors of the first SVOP report of 1992, on the wave of its popularity, decided to prepare another one in changed political conditions. It was announced as the Strategy for Russia (2), Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), May 27, 1994. The political camp centred around President Yeltsin won an internal political conflict with the opposition-dominated parliament in 1993, changing Russia’s political system to a quasi-presidential one. On the other hand, its foreign policy became increasingly assertive and critical of the West. The 1994 SVOP report shows signs of clear concern regarding the possible return of political conflict with the West, on the one hand, and calls for the joint construction of new security architecture in Europe (in line with the demands of Russian diplomacy at the time), on the other.

This was formulated in a hard way, as an alternative towards NATO’s eastward “expansion.” In response to the ongoing debate in the member states on the Alliance’s enlargement, Russian diplomacy promoted its own idea of European security architecture–the “concept of pan-European partnership”–since early 1994. The concept was presented in subsequent speeches by the head of Russian diplomacy: Poland in Russia’s Foreign Policy. Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Polish-Russian Conference “Towards a New Partnership,” Krakow, April 23, 1994 and Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Istanbul, June 10, 1994. The assumption of this concept was strengthening of those international structures that involved Russia’s full participation: the CSCE (which was proposed to be reformed and given the role of the main body responsible for coordinating security policy in Europe) and the NACC (which was to become the leading structure for coordination in the field of military security). The then head of Russian diplomacy, Andrei Kozyrev, used his visits to Central European countries to promote these visions on behalf of Russia (proposing, i.a., “cross-tiled security guarantees”) namely a concept of joint U.S.-Russian political assurances offered to Central and East Europeans instead of them seeking NATO membership (this was also the case during his visit to Poland in April 1994), as well as at the NACC forum (one of the first occasions to do so was the meeting in Istanbul in June 1994).

With this in mind, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace. This fact is confirmed by the document Discussions Between the North Atlantic Council, and the Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, Brussels, 22 Jun. 1994. Summary of Conclusion and Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, June 22, 1994. As part of the campaign against the eastward expansion of NATO, Russian diplomacy positively responded to the U.S.-German initiative of the Partnership for Peace, treating it as an alternative. However, Russia’s status as a PfP ordinary participant, of equal status to the countries of Central Europe and the CIS area did not correspond to its superpower ambitions and strategic identity. For this reason, it demanded an agreement on a special, privileged partnership with NATO and formal or informal guarantees of its non-enlargement. Discussions on this issue ended in a compromise. On the one hand, Russia agreed to sign the PfP Framework Document and, on the other hand, signed a short political document with the Alliance, which was an introduction to the NATO-Russia strengthened partnership, emphasising its de facto separate status in comparison to other PfP participants.

The progress of the NATO enlargement process systematically provoked angry reactions from the Russian authorities. One of the manifestations was the emotional and at times quite aggressive tone of the Address by the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Budapest, December 5, 1994. It was then that the Russian president spoke, i.a., of the threat of political conflict–describing it as a “cold peace” (a new form of the Cold War, one of Russia with the West). For the Alliance’s authorities, however, the situation was quite clear – the chances of withdrawing the Russian veto on the enlargement process did not exist, which did not have to mean, however, giving-up plans to constructively cooperate with Moscow. Nonetheless, NATO’s enlargement required, first, clear rules and justifications for the process to be worked-out, second, a solid consensus among the Allies for them (and some of them considered an agreement with Russia a priority), and third, a parallel “package” of cooperation initiatives with Russia.

Also, the following year Russia continued its efforts to undermine the eastward expansion of NATO. It undertook a twofold strategy. On the one hand, these were threats (mainly in the form of “controlled leaks” to media with the announcement of “retaliatory steps” against Central European countries). On the other hand, there was growing pressure on the Alliance for an agreement on special relations and political-military cooperation, which went much further than the proposal for the Central European and post-Soviet states participating in the PfP programme. The Alliance agreed to a general political act called Areas for Pursuance of a Broad Enhanced NATO–Russia Dialogue and Cooperation. Issued at the Meeting Between Ministers of the North Atlantic Council and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Noordwijk am Zee, The Netherlands, 31 May 1995.

A broad list of the recommendations for Russian policy on NATO enlargement is contained in another SVOP document: Russia and NATO. Theses of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council (SVOP), June 1995. It presents, as we read, a “deromanticised vision of the West” and a strategic approach to the problem, conscious of Russia’s strengths and weaknesses.

The determination of aspirants for NATO membership, the gradually growing support of the member states, and Russia’s increasing opposition threatening the cooperation showed the need for clear explainable grounds for future decisions. The idea was two-pronged: to make NATO’s enlargement objectives and methods transparent, thus reducing Moscow’s concerns, and to use Allied discussion on them to strengthen the internal political consensus. The outcome of this work was the extensive Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels, September 3, 1995. It described in six chapters the objectives and principles of this process, the purpose to strengthen European security and the role of the NACC and the PfP, how this process will strengthen NATO, the outcomes for new members, and conditions under which it will take place. The enlargement was to comply with the UN Charter and Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. This meant that, first, the relevant decision will be made solely by the NATO countries, based on an assessment of the willingness and ability to carry out membership duties, second, no other country can veto it. This was a clear political suggestion to Russia. Most of all, it was addressed to Russia–as a gesture of goodwill–that decisions on this matter will be made openly and without any surprises (no veto, no surprise). Passage of this document, today frequently neglected, was a provision allowing for the creation of NATO bases and military infrastructure on the territories of new members, which, however, was not made a condition of membership. However, these issues were put in a different light by subsequent documents.

The document Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session. The Final Communique, Brussels, 17-18 December 1996, reaffirming the will to enlarge NATO, indicated, however, that NATO states “have no intention, plan or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states, nor the need to change any aspect of the nuclear state or NATO’s nuclear policy, nor do they foresee the need to do so in the future.” This was a far-reaching declaration with major political implications. Although in those circumstances there were no reasons to move these weapons to the East and NATO ostentatiously exposed the “denuclearisation” of its strategy, it somewhat blindly limited the allied policy of deterrence.

A further step in this regard was taken with the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Collective Defence and other Missions, Brussels, Belgium, 14 March 1997, announcing that significant combat forces and military infrastructure will not be deployed on the new allies’ territories. Thus, the provisions of both cited documents represented an unequivocal withdrawal from the non-binding provisions of the 1995 “NATO Enlargement Study” concerning this issue. From today’s perspective, they are (rightly) assessed as a concession to Moscow and a unilateral action hindering the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the time, however, they were key components of a double compromise: with Russia, as a condition for basing mutual relations on a new political provision and between Allies, fearing the implications of NATO enlargement for relations with Russia. In this form, they paved the way for the enlargement of the organisation. At the end of 1996, the Russian authorities realised two things: that the admission of new members from Central Europe to NATO was unstoppable and would take place quickly, and that Moscow would not succeed (at least in the short term) in getting European states to create an alternative to NATO in the form of European security architecture based on the CSCE/OSCE institutions. This made Russia determined to intense negotiations on a new document regulating its relations with the Alliance.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, brought a new political basis for mutual relations. It symbolically preceded the decisions on NATO’s enlargement but indicated the willingness of the Alliance to maintain a uniform pace of development in its relations with Moscow. The form and legal status of the future document strongly divided both sides from the beginning of discussions. The North Atlantic Council considered a politically binding act to be the appropriate form of agreement. Russia demanded an international treaty that would guarantee that NATO’s nuclear forces would not be deployed on the territories of the new member states, foreign troops and equipment would not be stationed there, and allied infrastructure would not be developed. The essence of the Russian political action was to make NATO abandon its plan to admit new members, or to obtain assurances that enlargement would include only a narrow group of Central European countries–without the Baltic States and Ukraine. The document finally adopted was politically binding. Both sides stated in the document that they do not consider each other as opponents and have a common goal: to overcome previous differences and build mutual trust and cooperation. The first part of the act specified that the partnership between NATO and Russia was to be based on the indivisibility of security and respect for the general principles of international coexistence under international law, OSCE and UN standards. Among the specific principles of NATO’s cooperation with Russia, respect for democracy, political pluralism, human rights and civil liberties, a market economy, respect for the sovereignty of third countries, their independence, the right to choose how to ensure their security, as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes and abstention from the threat or the use of force were considered to be paramount. The second part of the document, devoted to consultation and cooperation mechanisms, established the new institution of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as an instrument for building consensus in areas of mutual interests. In the case of unanimity, joint action may be taken on a case-by-case basis. This section also contains an important provision that neither party will have a right of veto on issues reserved for sovereign decisions of a partner. The third chapter defined the thematic scope of the Council’s activities related to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The issues of conflict prevention and resolution were raised in detail, especially preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the safety of nuclear installations, arms control, conversion of armaments industries, emergency planning, environmental protection, combating organised crime, exchange of information related to defence and security, as well as information activities leading to the improvement of the partners’ image. The fourth part of the Act dealt with political-military matters, reiterating the unilateral declarations of the NAC on the lack of intentions, plans and reasons for deploying or storing nuclear weapons on the territories of the new member states as well as making revisions in its nuclear policy, and on the unwillingness to deploy there major NATO forces and military infrastructure. In this way, the basis for expressing its opinion in the areas defined in Chapter III of the document was created for Russia, which was to be taken into account by NATO in a non-binding manner. Moscow, therefore, might have felt that over time it would achieve “through the back door” a level of influence in allied decisions. NATO, on the other hand, had reason to believe that it was given an important instrument to influence Russia’s international behaviour and indirectly its systemic transformation. The course of time, however, negatively verified such expectations.

Preparations for NATO enlargement were also accompanied by an extended offer of cooperation addressed to partner countries. It was developed in 1997 and it aimed to replace the NACC with a new structure–the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The principles and objectives of its work were laid down in the Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, adopted on 30 May 1997 in Sintra. It broadened the scope of the consultation and increased the participation of partners in the planning and evaluation of civil and military joint ventures. The new rules of cooperation did not give formal security guarantees to participants outside the Alliance, and partners were not allowed to work on collective defence. A clear distinction was maintained between statuses: membership, meaning full rights and obligations, and partner, which granted privileges in cooperation but not hard obligations on members. To date, the EAPC organises political-military cooperation between the Alliance and interested Euro-Atlantic countries.

Important events in the sphere of security, especially the so-called First Chechen War (December 1994–August 1996), which cooled down Russia’s relations with the West, signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997, and the invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO (July 1997), led the Russian authorities to indicate their assessment of the situation by adopting The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of President Boris Yeltsin of December 17, 1997. The document showed the dual nature of the Russian authorities’ thinking: on the one hand, accusing Western states of moving military infrastructure to the East or interfering, by criticism of the war in Chechnya, with Russia’s internal affairs, and on the other hand, maintaining readiness for dialogue and cooperation with the West, provided that the interests of the Russian Federation are taken into account, which was reflected in the fact that the rules of participation of the Russian contingent in the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina were agreed with NATO.

NATO’s decision of March 1999, taken in the face of the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, to start bombing (former) Yugoslavia in order to force its authorities to halt the pacification action, caused outrage in Russia, for which it was a shock, showing the scale of its helplessness. Additionally, Moscow was concerned that the Alliance granted itself the right to use force without a UN Security Council mandate. A symbol of the Russian attitude towards these events was the decision of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was flying to the U.S., to order the plane to return to Moscow. It was accompanied by President Yeltsin’s extremely aggressive TV speech, which contained a clear suggestion of possible war between Russia and the West. Its content was expanded, also very strongly, in the Speech by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the UN Sergey Lavrov at the Security Council Meeting on the Situation in and Around Kosovo, New York, 24 March 1999. Russia accused NATO of violating international law and froze mutual relations. They resumed in July after the allied air attacks had ended. However, at Russia’s request, all discussions were limited to the issue of Kosovo, and subsequent meetings revealed differences of opinion on the KFOR operation, which also included a contingent of Russian military forces. NATO’s attempts to extend the discussion to include the topics provided for in the previously agreed work plan were consistently rejected by Moscow. The subsequent (second) war in Chechnya (since August 1999) further cooled the climate of contacts. However, the Kremlin’s firm opposition did not become a subject matter of discussion at the PJC forum. The willingness to return to dialogue with Russia, and its involvement in the stabilisation process in the Balkans, made it more complicated for NATO to take a more resolute stance on the Caucasus. Such a course of action hardened Moscow’s attitude towards cooperation with the Alliance.

The Washington Summit on 23–24 April 1999 summarised the post-Cold War transformation of NATO, setting new directions for the process. These were largely based on earlier decisions to adapt military capabilities, develop partnerships with Russia and other countries, accept new allies and keep an “open door to membership” in the future and NATO’s participation in peacekeeping operations. These directions were summarised by the Washington Summit Communique Issued by Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 24 April 1999., An Alliance for the 21st Century and The Alliance Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23 and 24 April 1999.

An important event for Russia’s relations with NATO was the Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe of 19 November 1999. The documents adopted at that time, especially the Charter for European Security and the Final Act of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, were important reference points for these relations. The former set out the principles on which they were to be based, while the latter, due to Russia’s failure to meet its commitments to withdraw its troops from Transnistria and Georgia, was soon to prove a bone of contention in relations between NATO and Moscow. As part of its attempts to promote an alternative (to NATO-based) construction of European security, Russia postulated in the 1990s that the CSCE states (since 1994, the OSCE) should sign a legally binding international agreement that would grant Moscow the ability to influence decisions concerning these issues (including de facto the right of veto over NATO enlargement). Based on the Russian proposals of 1994, Moscow succeeded, two years later, in launching a formal discussion in the OSCE on “a comprehensive model of European security for the 21st century.” This resulted in the compromise Charter for European Security Signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on November 18, 1999, which confirmed, on the one hand, the key political principle for Russia of “indivisibility of security,” but on the other hand, the key principle to the future of NATO enlargement of free choice of political-military alliances, also embedded in international law. Contrary to Russia’s demands, the document only took the form of a political declaration (not a legally-binding treaty) containing a set of norms and postulates and did not play an important role in the development of European security institutions.

On the other hand, fundamental geopolitical and geostrategic changes in Europe in the 1990s, and especially the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, necessitated a revision of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It was decided by means of The Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Istanbul, November 19, 1999. Difficult negotiations were held in 1996–1999 in Vienna. In particular, the negotiations involved moving away from formal block provisions in the established limits on military equipment. Russia also wanted to change the restrictions (in the so-called flank zones) on the deployment of troops on its European territory and to neutralise the military consequences of NATO’s enlargement to Central European countries. In an adapted treaty, Russia succeeded in partially limiting the size of the possible deployment of foreign armed forces to the territories of future Central European NATO members (except for the Baltic states). Nevertheless, Russia made commitments (the so-called Istanbul commitments) to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia. The failure to fulfil some of these commitments became the reason why the adapted CFE treaty could not enter into force.

Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, 15 December 1999, was an attempt to evaluate NATO’s position on cooperation with Russia following the Washington Summit and the resumption of mutual contacts. This evaluation included maintaining cooperation with Russia based on previous arrangements, cooperation in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the need for Moscow to comply with international agreements (including the commitments of the adapted CFE Treaty), and the will to peacefully resolve the conflict in Chechnya.

Within a few months after the takeover on 31 December 1999 of the responsibilities of the president of Russia from the outgoing Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin signed a series of basic documents on Russian foreign, security and defence policy: The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of January 10, 2000, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of April 21, 2000, and The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of June 28, 2000. These documents were to show the political change that had taken place in Russia, present a new diagnosis of the international situation and, consequently, a new interpretation of Russian policies. They differed from those adopted in the Yeltsin era (in 1997 and especially in 1993) with a more pessimistic picture of the international situation and threats to Russia. More critical were, i.a., the provisions concerning the U.S. and NATO and more assertive definition of the Russian strategic goals was given. These provisions clearly referred to Russian criticism of NATO: enlargement to the East, bombings in Yugoslavia and the new strategic concept (all events took place in 1999).

After Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suddenly and unexpectedly took up his duties as president of Russia, a certain era in Russian domestic and foreign policy, symbolised by his predecessor, came to an end. Foreign observers (especially in the West) were then asking themselves the question: “Who is Mr Putin?” In the spring of 2000, he gave a series of interviews to Western opinion-forming media to present himself and his views. Among other things was the Interview of the Acting President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin for the BBC on March 5, 2000. It is remembered mainly because of the unexpected declaration of the new president that he did not rule out the future membership of Russia in NATO. This was then interpreted as evidence of the Russian leader’s pragmatism, even though the same interview also included criticism of the West. The main idea of the conversation was Russia’s willingness to form a partnership with the West, but only on equal terms, i.e., taking into account its key interests. This was an announcement of Russia’s more assertive foreign policy.

The first year and a half of President Putin’s term were characterised by a certain discrepancy between his rather pragmatic rhetoric and his attempts to rebuild relations with countries hostile to the West, especially to the U.S. (such as Cuba, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, or North Korea). However, the assertive policy of the new U.S. President George W. Bush prompted Putin to change his tactics to a more conciliatory one, which took place around mid-2001. He then returned to formulating his offers to the West, which also concerned NATO. During the long Press Conference of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Moscow, July 18, 2001, he suggested, i.a., several options for the arrangement of relations with NATO. One of them was Russia’s membership in its political structures. This was to be understood as a “test case.”

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the U.S. caused a shock and led to a redefinition of the security situation in the entire Western community. Putin’s Russia saw this as a unique opportunity to bring about a breakthrough in relations with the West and to implement its former demands in the sphere of European security. The symbol of Russia’s “pro-western turn” at the time was the limited support given to the U.S. in the retaliatory attack on Afghanistan and the offer to strengthen cooperation with NATO and the EU. One of the elements of this Russian tactic was the major policy statement Address by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in the German Bundestag, Berlin, September 25, 2001, which contained a general vision of a “multidimensional, gradual integration of Russia and Europe,” referring to Mikhail Gorbachev’s “Common European Home” from the late 1980s and Boris Yeltsin’s “Greater Europe” (presented by him in October 1997 in Strasbourg). This concept, to which Putin returned in the following years, was intended to lead to the recognition of the division of Europe into two zones: the western, dominated by Germany, and the eastern, dominated by Russia–with de facto limitation of U.S. presence and influence.

The change of climate was also conducive to establishing cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism and to correcting the institutional basis of the Alliance’s relations with Russia. It was brought by a joint declaration, NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, signed by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation on 28 May 2002, at the summit in Prattica di Mare (near Rome). It established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the successor of the former PJC. The Council was to work under new rules, according to which Russia was no longer to confront a pre-coordinated joint NATO position (which had long been its demand). Over the next few years, the cooperation developed without changing the Russian attitude towards the Alliance. It covered a wide range of security issues, although it was usually not particularly comprehensive. It is worth mentioning: Moscow’s consent to the transit of supplies to ISAF forces in Afghanistan, the exchange of intelligence information related to the anti-terrorism campaign and data on air traffic, the fight against maritime piracy, drug production and trafficking, training of Afghan security forces, destruction of surplus ammunition, conventional disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis management or the transformation of the defence sector. Consultations were also undertaken on international crises–from the Balkans through North Africa, to the Caucasus and Afghanistan–and on air-defence cooperation. However, the most advanced cooperation developed based on the NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism. The Strategic Objectives, agreed on 9 December 2004.

The U.S.-led coalition military intervention in Iraq in 2003 (made without an explicit mandate from the UNSC), followed by a series of so-called “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet states (in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005) were interpreted in the Kremlin as an attempt, supported by the West, to forcefully make fundamental geopolitical changes against Russia. This was accompanied by a tightening of the authoritarian course of domestic policy and a growing sense of strength resulting from the boom in the market for energy resources, the main source of Russia’s growing GDP. When Washington ignored Russian warnings and calls for a strategic agreement on the delimitation of interests, in 2006 the Kremlin decided to increase the offensive stance in Russian policy towards the West (and especially towards the U.S. and NATO). Symbolic manifestation of this new policy was the Speech and Q and A of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the Security Policy Conference in Munich, February 10, 2007. Although from today’s perspective its content does not sound particularly radical, it was then a real shock to the West, which was not used to such harsh accusations against it.

Guided by the spirit of this “new assertiveness,” the Russian authorities took several practical steps, demonstrating its disagreement with the current global and European security order. The NATO countries did not want to ignore Russia’s failure to meet some of the so-called Istanbul commitments and rejected its demand for another revision of the adapted CFE Treaty. This gave Russia an excuse to suspend implementation of the treaty and to blame NATO for the whole situation. This decision and its justification are contained in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of July 15, 2007, on Suspension of the CFE Treaty with Explanatory Information.

Russia quite early pointed out to the West that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the deployment of elements of the American missile defence shield in Central Europe, and the further enlargement of NATO (by adopting Ukraine and Georgia) will be perceived as crossing “red lines” and responded with unspecified retaliatory actions. The NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 was particularly relevant to the latter issue. Although it declared political support for the membership of Ukraine and Georgia, it did not specify a deadline, nor did it decide to offer these countries participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Russia had already decided to actively counteract this possibility. The signal of its determination was given in the Speech of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, April 4, 2008 (during the closed part of the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council). It is known to the international public for its (controlled?) “leak” in Ukraine. The Russian president, in a harsh way, threatened to destabilise Georgia and Ukraine (in the latter case, even break up the country), which four months later became a reality in the case of Georgia. Taking advantage of the formal change in political leadership (in May 2008, Putin’s close co-worker, Dmitry Medvedev became president of Russia, and the former took the position of prime minister, remaining de facto the main decision-maker), the Kremlin decided to once again introduce its ideas for revising the European security order. The first, general proposal on this issue–henceforth called the “Medvedev plan”–was made during the Speech of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev in Berlin, June 5, 2008. Its primary point was to convene a pan-European summit that would develop a new multilateral agreement on European security.

Russia initiated a successful provocation that led to the outbreak of a five-day Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. This was followed by Moscow’s recognition of the independence of the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian-Georgian war marked another serious crisis in NATO relations with Moscow. As a result of the Russian actions in the Caucasus, the Alliance suspended its cooperation in the NRC, and its position was included in the Statement on Georgia, Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, August 19, 2008. The interval in cooperation lasted until March the following year.

Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Moscow’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were a shock to the West. Russia decided to use the situation to present a general framework of its foreign policy to the West by making an offer of conditional partnership under new, more beneficial principles. This was the subject of an extensive Interview with the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev for Russian TV, Moscow, August 31, 2008. It contained five principles of Russian foreign policy (then informally called the “Medvedev doctrine”). The most widely commented point in the West was–though unspecified–Russia’s “privileged areas of interest,” which was a euphemistic definition of sphere of influence. Russia’s official policy at the time was twofold: on the one hand, it declared pragmatism and conditional partnership with the West, and on the other hand, it treated the West (especially the U.S. and NATO) as an essential source of potential threats and declared a strong defence of Moscow’s (vaguely defined) national interests. This was reflected in the new conceptual documents: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev of July 15, 2008, The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2000 Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev of May 12, 2009 and The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev of February 2, 2010.

In 2009, the Western countries attempted to engage constructively with “Medvedev’s Russia” (which included the “reset” policy of U.S. President Barack Obama and the “partnership for transformation” policy of the European Union). As they expected Russia to clarify their postulates, the Draft Treaty on European Security, November 29, 2009, was created in Moscow. It was developed by a group of experts cooperating with the Kremlin, gathered around Sergei Karaganov and the journal Rossiya w globalnoy politikie (Russia in Global Politics). The document proved to be as concise as it was controversial. For example, it aimed to create a conflict-resolution system competitive not only towards NATO but also towards the UN, which had no chance to work efficiently.

After a decade of discussions and disputes over the priorities and balance of the NATO missions, the allies adopted the document Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010. It pointed to the low probability of a conventional threat of armed aggression against member states, shifting the burden of conclusions to the increase in risk resulting from the development and the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. A catalogue of diverse challenges was added: from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, through energy security, availability of maritime transport routes, to cyberthreats. The main NATO objectives were described in three missions, related to a) deterrence and defence, b) crisis management, and c) cooperative security. Relations with Russia based on mutual commitments (the third part of NATO missions), were identified as of strategic importance as a factor for peace and stability in Europe. It was made clear that Russia was not a threat to the Alliance and that its efforts to practical cooperation should be reciprocated by Russia.

The NATO Lisbon Summit was accompanied by NATO-Russia discussions at the highest level. These were summarised by the NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement. Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council Held in Lisbon on 20 November 2010. Almost half of the text was taken up by specifying the principles and goals of cooperation, which was important due to the repeated accusations of their violation on both sides. The remaining part of the document referred to priority areas of cooperation, including missile defence, maritime safety, combating terrorism and organised crime. The issues of counter-terrorism cooperation were addressed in detail in the subsequent NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism of 15 April 2011. Its Executive Summary is contained in this volume.

The “thaw” in relations with the West under President Dmitry Medvedev finally ended after the beginning of a wave of political protests in Russia in December 2011 (which the Kremlin apparently considered an American attempted coup d’état) and after the return of Vladimir Putin to the office of president (May 2012). So as NATO and Russia celebrated the 10th anniversary of the renewal of relations, i.e., the Rome Declaration, it was in the Chairman’s Statement of the Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held in Brussels on 19 April 2012 that summarised the dialogue and cooperation to date. The gradually growing, so far most serious crisis in Russia’s relations with the West was reflected, i.a., in the text of The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of February 12, 2013, which was amended under the leadership of the new head of state. The level of criticism of the West, its institutions, and policies was elevated. The political paranoia in the Kremlin was increasingly evident here.

The unsuccessful attempt to force the Ukrainian authorities to become a member of another economic and political integration structure initiated by Russia (initially called the Customs Union) and the successful one–to withdraw the country from concluding an Association Agreement with the EU–led to another Ukrainian revolution in late 2013 and beginning of 2014. Also, this time (as in 2004) the Kremlin treated it as Western anti-Russian subversion and decided to demonstrate its determination by military aggression. This was manifested by the occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea and then organising and supporting the rebellion in Donbas, which evolved into a low-intensity Russian-Ukrainian war. The solemn act of Crimea’s annexation in March 2014, held in a climate of a “patriotic boost,” allowed Putin to make a major policy speech. In the Address of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of March 18, 2014, he de facto formulated the basis of the doctrine justifying Russia’s right to intervene in the defence of its default sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area under the slogan of defending the “Russian-speaking population” and the civilisation community of the “Russian world.” The text of the speech contains a whole catalogue of accusations against the West (especially the U.S. and NATO), reflecting the deep resentment and political paranoia of the Russian leader. The act of the annexation of Crimea was presented as an “act of historical justice against the background of Western aggression and hypocrisy.”

In their Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers of 1 April 2014, the Allies condemned the illegal military intervention by Russia and the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They refused to recognise the annexation of Crimea, calling on Russia to act in accordance with international law and its political obligations. In the face of the violation of the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, all civil and military cooperation between NATO and Russia was suspended (while maintaining the diplomatic communication channel). This state of affairs has continued until now, and Russia’s subsequent actions do not provide any reason to believe that it will change quickly.

The Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014, states a complete perspective on NATO activities. The section on Russia, however, marks a major change in tone and assessment of the state of relations. Moscow’s aggressive actions against Ukraine (and the terrorist threat from the South) were described as “a turning point for Euro-Atlantic security and a hard test for the allied vision of a united, free and peaceful Europe.” The text of the declaration contains a catalogue of allegations against Russia considered as security threats: violation of international law, violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a foreign country, support for separatist groups, deterioration of the situation of civilians caused by their actions, discrimination against ethnic groups, and the shooting down of a passenger plane. NATO supported international sanctions against Russia, calling on Moscow to restore the status quo ante. It upheld earlier decisions to suspend practical cooperation and their change depended on modification of Moscow’s attitude and its return to compliance with international law. However, it also expressed interest in the development of constructive mutual relations, declaring that it does not pose a threat to Russia. The described state of affairs also became the main premise for the decision to strengthen NATO’s military capabilities, including its presence on the Alliance’s Eastern Flank.

This was also reflected in a series of three Russian documents of a conceptual-doctrinal nature: The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of December 25, 2014, The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of December 31, 2015, and The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of November 30, 2016. There was a clear sharpening of their language: The West, and especially the U.S. and NATO, became identified as opponents, accused of creating a direct threat to Russia and causing global and regional instability. The latter document also clearly suggested that if the West does not abandon its “anti-Russian” policy, Russia will deepen its cooperation (and even take steps towards limited economic and political integration) with China. In the last of these documents, NATO’s enlargement was considered a systemic problem of Euro-Atlantic relations, which could be solved by creating a pan-European security system. The document also accuses the West of pursuing a policy of containment and consistently shifting its military potential towards Russian borders.

The Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, states in an unprecedentedly open manner that “Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activity on NATO’s borders and the demonstrated willingness to pursue political objectives through threats or the use of force, are a source of instability in the region, pose a serious challenge to the Alliance, violate Euro-Atlantic security and threaten our long-term goal of an undivided, free and peaceful Europe.” This confirms not only the seriousness of the situation, which revises the allied security assessments but directly (at least for today)–an important failure of the political project of institutional relations and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia. They were not only to improve the security of both sides but also to increase stability in Europe and be the basis for international anti-crisis solutions. The text of the declaration brings several detailed allegations against Russia and specifies the Alliance’s position. It also indicates the steps NATO will take to strengthen the deterrence and defence measures of the member states. In the political sense, the message addressed to Moscow has explicitly formulated that NATO does not seek confrontation and does not pose a threat to Russia, but cannot and will not give way to the principles on which the Alliance and security in Europe and North America are based, but will remain transparent, predictable and decisive.

Russia, through its aggression against Ukraine and a whole series of political and security actions against Western countries, has thus provoked a limited response from the U.S. and NATO. Its component included the decisions of the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits to strengthen the Eastern Flank through what has been termed “enhanced forward presence” and increased military activity. Russia responded, i.a., by disproportionately increasing the militarisation of its western flanks bordering NATO and Ukraine, intensifying military exercises and provocative behaviour in airspace and international waters. Nor has it changed its behaviour in Ukraine. Moscow’s critical rhetorical reaction to the decisions of the Warsaw Summit included speeches in media by Russian diplomats and politicians, including the Interview with the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at NATO Alexandr Grushko on Rossiya TV on July 24, 2016.

The NATO working Summit held in Brussels on 25 May 2017, did not produce a formal communiqué. Despite the meeting’s other priorities, the issue of relations with Russia was also present in the discussions of the allied heads of state and government. The Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meeting of NATO Heads of State and/or Government, 25 May 2017, confirms Brussels’ position on this issue as based on the intention to continue the policy of strengthening collective defence and deterrence while being open to political dialogue with Moscow.

The years following the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 have not brought an end to the deep crisis in Russia’s relations with the West, including the countries and NATO partners. The Kremlin, recognising de facto the existence of confrontation, a  sui generis hybrid war, with them, resorted to point-based attacks on individual states using various methods: cyberattacks, political diversion, disinformation campaigns, armed demonstrations. Some of these actions took a drastic form. This was the case with the attempted murder with chemical weapons of a Russian immigrant, a former officer of the Russian secret service, Sergei Skripal, undertaken in the UK in March 2018 by two officers of Russian military intelligence. On the Russian side, this was a (not entirely successful) political demonstration of the potential for harm, but at the same time a test of the Western community’s cohesion and solidarity aimed against Russia. Contrary to Russian calculations, Western states, including EU and NATO members, reacted with decisions on the collective expulsion of Russian spies working under diplomatic cover (a total of 30 states expelled 122 Russian diplomats). Moscow rejected these allegations by condemning these decisions in a Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 26, 2018.

The NATO Summit in Brussels convened for July 2018, summed-up several years of intense work of the Alliance’s leaders (who met four times in the last four years). The Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–12 July 2018, contained a comprehensive summary of the organisation’s positions on security and defence, as well as indicated the directions of its development for the coming years. On Russian issues, it upheld the position presented by NATO in the recent period and assessed Moscow’s international conduct very harshly. In Point 4 of this document, we read: “Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment. While NATO stands by its international commitments, Russia has breached the values, principles, and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia relationship, as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 2002 Rome Declaration, broken the trust at the core of our cooperation, and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture,” a lengthy set of facts substantiating this claim was presented in Point 6: “The Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; its military posture and provocative military activities, including near NATO borders, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violation of NATO Allied airspace, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernisation of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nuclear dimension. This is compounded by Russia’s continued violation, non-implementation, and circumvention of numerous obligations and commitments in the realm of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Russia is also challenging Euro-Atlantic security and stability through hybrid actions, including attempted interference in the election processes, and the sovereignty of our nations, as was the case in Montenegro, widespread disinformation campaigns, and malicious cyber activities. We condemn the attack using a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom, and note the independent confirmation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the nerve agent used. The UK assesses that it is highly likely that the Russian Federation was responsible for the attack and that there is no plausible alternative explanation.” 

During this period, there was also increasing evidence of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, one of the most important arms-control agreements for European security. The Alliance and, bilaterally, the U.S. repeatedly raised this problem directly with Moscow, to which it responded with denials. NATO’s position on Russia’s conduct is expressed in two further documents: Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 4 December 2018, and the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 2 August 2019. The first one calls on Russia to return to compliance with the treaty and indicates its responsibility for the future of this agreement. The second addresses the situation created by the U.S. termination of the treaty due to Russian violations of its provisions.

Aggressive Russian actions towards the West resulted, i.a., from a specific perception of the world among members of the narrow ruling group in Russia, but also a specific understanding of recent history. One of its illustrations is Interview with the Defence Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoygu for the Moskovskiy Komsomolets Daily, September 22, 2019, in which he points to the systemically anti-Russian nature of Western policy, including the U.S. and NATO after the end of the Cold War.

Interview with NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller for the Kommersant Daily, 17 October 2019, is maintained in a completely different, constructive tone. The U.S. Deputy Secretary General, who is leaving her office, is giving a realistic review of the state and prospects for NATO-Russia relations with a Russian journalist. It is in line with NATO’s position, signalling a dual-track approach to cooperation with Moscow: readiness for dialogue, but without compromising on principles and the expectation that the partner will observe its commitments.

The London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 3-4 December 2019, summarises NATO’s identity and the main directions of threats in its 70th year of existence. On Russian issues, there is an important reference to “Russia’s aggressive actions” as “a threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” The meaning of this phrase is more than just political rhetoric. The Allies indicated Russia’s conduct and its aggressive characteristics as the source of the threat, not Russia itself–thus presenting an open attitude towards dialogue if the cause of the threat was removed, i.e., in fact, the country would return to respecting its commitments and principles of international law.

The limited, defensive actions of NATO and its Member States were criticised in a document containing Speeches of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoygu at the Defence Ministry Board Meeting, December 24, 2019, and provided an excuse for further intensive growth of Russia’s military (conventional and nuclear) capabilities. However, the process of accelerated militarisation of Russia, contrary to the claims of Russian politicians, began even before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the decisions of the NATO summits in Newport and Warsaw. In the aforementioned, last document, one can also read a philippic of President Vladimir Putin against Poland which does not fit the circumstances. Part of Russia’s anti-Western activities was a “policy of memory” campaign, launched by the Kremlin in late 2019, mainly against Poland. The accusations of anti-Semitism and alleged collaboration of Poland with Nazi Germany were intended to cover the co-responsibility of the USSR (of which the current Russian leaders felt as continuators) for the aggression against Poland in 1939 and the then Soviet-German division of Eastern Europe, which was a manifestation of the Kremlin’s political exploitation of history.

The crisis in Russia’s relations with NATO has not only passed but has even deepened. There were further problems of contention. One of them was Russia’s violation of the Medium and Intermediate-Range Missile Ban Treaty (INF), which led to the U.S. decision to leave the treaty, to which Moscow responded with a similar step (in February 2019; the treaty expired in August 2019). Russia, blaming the U.S. for breaking the INF, tried to divide NATO by proposing a so-called moratorium on the deployment of missiles in Europe banned by the treaty (in a situation in which Russia had already started deploying them and NATO was only just beginning a long discussion on this issue). Minister Lavrov mentions the moratorium among the issues raised in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Answers to Media Questions Following the 56th Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 17, 2020. Other issues mentioned in the document include Russian proposals aimed at limiting NATO’s activity in Russia’s neighbouring regions, including the Baltic Sea (on the pretext of avoiding incidents) while at the same time Moscow refused to talk to NATO countries about adapting the Vienna Document on confidence-building and security measures. In Minister Lavrov’s reply, one can also read the conditions that Moscow has set for the continuation of the dialogue on the forum of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and certain hopes for the French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiatives, which were not agreed with his NATO allies, to start a dialogue on European security with Russia.

Further enlargement of NATO in the Western Balkans was also part of the Russian-NATO tensions. Russia tried to hinder this process in various ways (through political campaigns, information wars, and even subversion attempts). This was, however, ineffective. In June 2017, Montenegro became a new member of NATO (after the Russian attempt of political subversion organised in October 2016 on the occasion of the parliamentary elections in the country had failed), and in March 2020, Northern Macedonia joined NATO (despite the Russian disinformation-political campaign in 2018 aimed at blocking the Greek-Macedonian agreement, which had so far blocked the country’s accession to the Alliance). Moscow was only left to demonstrate its frustration and criticism of these decisions, which is reflected in the Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on North Macedonia Joining NATO, March 31, 2020.

Russia tried to preventively respond to any discussion about the possible departure of NATO states from the formal observance of selected provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 declaration on NATO-Russia relations of Pratica di Mare, even though Moscow itself has broken almost all of the rules contained therein. This was also the case with the speculation that occurred in connection with the debate on the future of NATO’s nuclear sharing programme (Allied cooperation in nuclear defence). Suggestions made publicly by the U.S. ambassador to Poland, Georgette Mosbacher, that Poland could also be covered by the programme, caused immediate criticism in Moscow, which is reflected, i.a., in the text of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference Following a Ministerial Video Session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Moscow, May 19, 2020.

Another part of the conflict was the Open Skies Treaty (OST), which became one of the foundations of building transparency in the military activities of Russia and NATO following the end of the Cold War. It provided for mutual inspection flights over the territories of the parties’ countries (most of the countries of Europe and North America). Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the Open Skies Treaty, 22 May 2020, emphasises the alliance’s attachment to the arms-control regime, noting, at the same time, Russia’s long-standing behaviour, which is incompatible with the treaty, and disregard for NATO’s calls to correct such behaviour. The statement also notes the announcement of the U.S. withdrawing from the treaty as a result of Russia’s conduct and the fact that “the U.S. has declared that it may, however, reconsider its withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance with the Treaty.”

Although the Open Skies regime has been in crisis for years because of its violation by Russia, Moscow has not missed an opportunity to use this as another element of criticism of Washington and attempts to divide the NATO allies. In addition to the ongoing dispute over the conditions of dialogue within the NRC, this became the main topic of Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Grushko’s Interview with the TASS News Agency, June 6, 2020. It was also Moscow’s direct response to the NATO Secretary General’s statement of 22 May.

The Statement by the North Atlantic Council Concerning Malicious Cyber Activities, 3 June, 2020, does not apply, however, directly to Russia. It points to the growing threat from hacking attacks and harmful/criminal behaviour in cyberspace–especially in the era of the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this position is indirectly addressed to all sponsors and executors of such activities. It is also important in this context the mention included in the text that “cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence.”

The Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, 4 September, 2020, strongly condemns the attack on the Russian oppositionist with the use of a nerve agent from the banned Novichok group, as an illegal act in clear violation of international norms. It also contains a call on Russia to bring those responsible for the act to justice, and to disclose any relevant information to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

This volume is complemented in the annex with the NATO-made NRC Practical Cooperation Fact Sheet (October 2013). It brings a collection of information on undertakings of the NATO-Russia Council since the signing of the Rome Declaration, developed by NATO Headquarters. It provides an overview not only of their nature and intensity (the reading is facilitated by the division of the described undertakings into areas of cooperation) but also of plans for the future. They were suspended after the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

* * *

The authors hope that this volume of documents will be of interest not only to readers seeking source knowledge on NATO-Russia relations but also to researchers of contemporary international relations, security experts, diplomats, students, journalists, and politicians. We address this book to them all.

The authors thank the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division for the scientific grant that facilitated collecting materials and publication of this volume, co-edited with the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Our thanks are invariably addressed to Dr. Sławomir Dębski, director of PISM, for encouraging our research. We would like to thank the team of editors and translators of the institute for their hard and patient work as well as their professionalism.

The history of NATO-Russia relations does not end, so this volume of documents is not the last one...

Robert Kupiecki, Marek Menkiszak

Warsaw, October 2020